Abstract

  


 



Are Self-Regarding Subjects More Rational?


Benito Arruñada


Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Marco Casari


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Francesca Pancotto


University of Modena and Reggio Emilia
January 16, 2012

Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 805

Abstract:     
Through an experiment, we investigate how the level of rationality relates to concerns for equality and efficiency. Subjects perform dictator games and a guessing game. More rational subjects are not more frequently of the self-regarding type. When performing a comparison within the same degree of rationality, self-regarding subjects show more strategic sophistication than other subjects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

Keywords: steps of reasoning, other-regarding preferences

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D63

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Date posted: January 19, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Arruñada, Benito, Casari, Marco and Pancotto, Francesca, Are Self-Regarding Subjects More Rational? (January 16, 2012). Quaderni DSE Working Paper No. 805. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1987556 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1987556

Contact Information

Benito Arruñada (Contact Author)
Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )
Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
Department of Economics and Business
08005 Barcelona
Spain
+34 93 542 25 72 (Phone)
+34 93 542 17 46 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upf.es/~arrunada
Marco Casari
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
Francesca Pancotto
University of Modena and Reggio Emilia ( email )
Viale Berengario, 51
Modena, Modena 41100
Italy
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