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Verti-Zontal Differentiation in Monopolistic Competition


Francesco Di Comite


Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)

Jacques-François Thisse


affiliation not provided to SSRN

Hylke Vandenbussche


Université Catholique de Louvain, IRES, CORE, LICOS-KUL and CEPR; Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), LICOS & CEPR

January 2012

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8752

Abstract:     
The pattern of trade observed from firm-product-country data calls for a new generation of models. To address the unexplained variation in the data, we propose a new model of monopolistic competition where varieties enter preferences non-symmetrically, capturing both horizontal and vertical differentiation in an unprecedented way. Together with a variable elasticity of substitution, competition effects, varying markups and prices across countries, this results in a tractable model that rationalizes the empirical finding that firm-product quantities show systematically more variability than prices across export destinations. Accounting for unexplained data variation, our model can thus be used to improve demand identification.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 54

Keywords: heterogenous firms, horizontal differentiation, monopolistic competition, non-symmetric varieties, vertical differentiation

JEL Classification: D43, F12, F14, L16

working papers series


Date posted: January 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Di Comite, Francesco, Thisse, Jacques-François and Vandenbussche, Hylke, Verti-Zontal Differentiation in Monopolistic Competition (January 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8752. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988683

Contact Information

Francesco Di Comite (Contact Author)
Catholic University of Louvain (UCL) ( email )
Place Montesquieu, 3
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium
Jacques-François Thisse
affiliation not provided to SSRN ( email )
Hylke Vandenbussche
Université Catholique de Louvain, IRES, CORE, LICOS-KUL and CEPR ( email )
Department of Economics
Place Montesquieu 3
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium
+32 10 47 41 37 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/NDBAD40/
Catholic University of Leuven (KUL), LICOS & CEPR ( email )
Faculty of Economics
Naamsestraat 69
B-3000 Leuven, 3000
Belgium
+32 16 326 920 (Phone)
+32 16 326 732 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/NDBAD40/
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