Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines (STICERD); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University of Pennsylvania - Management Department; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
University College London - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8776
Many organizations rely on teamwork, and yet field evidence on the impacts of team-based incentives remains scarce. Compared to individual incentives, team incentives can affect productivity by changing both workers effort and team composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely to form teams with others of similar ability instead of with their friends. Introducing rank incentives however reduces average productivity by 14%, whereas introducing a tournament increases it by 24%. Both effects are heterogeneous: rank incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments only increase the productivity of teams at the top. We interpret these results through a theoretical framework that makes precise when the provision of team-based incentives crowds out the productivity enhancing effect of social connections under team production.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 50
Keywords: rank incentives, team-based incentives, teams, tournaments
JEL Classification: D23, J33, M52working papers series
Date posted: January 20, 2012
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