Optimal Attorney Advertising
Michael P. Stone
Quinnipiac University - Department of Economics
Thomas J. Miceli
University of Connecticut - Department of Economics
July 1, 2011
Attorney advertising routinely targets tort victims. This paper reviews the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on attorney advertising, and develops a theoretical model that incorporates advertising intensity, litigation costs, and an endogenous number of lawsuits. Since advertising induces victims to bring suit, it increases the level of injurer care. However, litigation costs are also incurred. At the optimum, the marginal benefit of deterrence equals the sum of marginal litigation and advertising costs. Although blanket prohibitions on attorney advertising are likely to be suboptimal (consistent with the Court’s position), some regulations may be justified.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 26
Keywords: Tort, Liability, Advertising, Attorneys, Lawyer, Legal Services
JEL Classification: K13, K41, L15, L84working papers series
Date posted: January 23, 2012
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.390 seconds