The Paradox of the Veto in Mexico (1917-1997)
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) - Political Science Department
Jeffrey A. Weldon
Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM)
September 6, 2001
We report work in progress. Existing explanations of veto incidence do not seem to account for the case of classic Mexico. Proceedings of the Chamber of Deputies from 1917 to 1963 report that Mexican presidents returned at least 223 bills to Congress instead of signing them into law. This level of veto incidence is puzzling from numerous theoretical perspectives. For Mexicanists hardly any executive veto should have taken place after 1936, when iron discipline to the mandates of the president was consolidated with the end of the diarquía. For similar reasons, those who explain vetoes on the mistaken evaluations of members of Congress over presidential preferences have little bite on the explanation of Mexico’s vetoes: the president was the leader of the congressional party. Those who explain vetoes as attempts to publicize politicians’ positions in contrast with those of vetoing actors would need to take into account the fact that election politics was never undertaken by campaigning against the incumbent president.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 24
Keywords: executive-legislative relations, veto, Mexico
JEL Classification: D72, D74working papers series
Date posted: January 25, 2012
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