The Proposal for a Regulation on a Common European Sales Law: Shortcomings of the Most Recent Textual Layer of European Contract Law
University of Munich; University of Oxford
University of Muenster
University of Wuerzburg
Humboldt University School of Law; Erasmus School of Law; University of Chicago Law School
Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law
January 25, 2012
Juristenzeitung, pp. 269-289, 2012
On 11 October 2011, the European Commission published a Proposal for a Regulation on an optional Common European Sales Law (CESL). This text represents a milestone for the further development of European contract law. Our essay critically examines and evaluates the Commission’s proposal. It outlines the Commission’s draft as well as its background and deals with some of the most pressing doctrinal and policy issues raised by it. We show that the suggested range of application and the technical mode for opting into the CESL are flawed. Further, the CESL incorporates many elements and doctrines of the current acquis communautaire, such as unduly extensive information duties and withdrawal rights as well as a policing of standard contract terms, without reconsidering their proper purposes and uses. With respect to the rules on sales law, it is particularly the mandatory character of most of them that poses grave problems. We also demonstrate that the CESL’s optional character does not eliminate the quality concerns raised in this essay: The CESL might become a ‘success’ despite its shortcomings. Hence, notwithstanding its optional character, the proposed text should not be enacted. What is needed is a broad and thorough debate on the scope, forms and contents of contract law harmonization in Europe rather than the speedy legislative enactment of a flawed product.
Please note that this is an article published in German.
Keywords: Common European Sales Law, European Contract Law, Harmonization of Laws, Regulatory Competition, Acquis Communautaire, Optional Instrument
Date posted: January 25, 2012 ; Last revised: March 30, 2012
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