Evaluating Antitrust Leniency Programs
University of Barcelona
Juan Luis Jimenez
University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria
affiliation not provided to SSRN
October 30, 2012
XREAP No. 2012-01
This paper identifies and then quantifies econometrically the impact of leniency programs on the perception of the effectiveness of antitrust policies in the business community using panel data for as much as 59 countries and 14-year span. We use the dynamics of the gradual diffusion of leniency programs across countries and over time to evaluate the impact of the program, taking care of the bias caused by self-selection into the program. We find that leniency programs increase the perception of effectiveness by an order of magnitude ranging from 10% to 21%. Leniency programs have become weapons of mass dissuasion in the hands of antitrust enforcers against the more damaging forms of explicit collusion among rival firms in the market place.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 49
Keywords: Antitrust, Leniency Programs, Policy effectiveness, Program Evaluation, Political economy
JEL Classification: D7, K2, L4, O4working papers series
Date posted: January 30, 2012 ; Last revised: November 22, 2012
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