Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993037
 
 

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Engineering an Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring


G. Mitu Gulati


Duke University - School of Law

Jeromin Zettelmeyer


European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

January 29, 2012


Abstract:     
For some months now, discussions over how Greece will restructure its debt have been constrained by the requirement that the deal be “voluntary” – implying that Greece would continue debt service to any creditors that choose retain their old bonds rather than tender them in an exchange offer. In light of Greece’s deep solvency problems and lack of agreement with its creditors so far, the notion of a voluntary debt exchange is increasingly looking like a mirage. In this essay, we describe and compare three alternative approaches that would achieve an orderly restructuring but avoid an outright default: (1) “retrofitting” and using a collective action clause (CAC) that would allow the vast majority of outstanding Greek government bonds to be restructured with the consent of a supermajority of creditors; (2) combining the use of a CAC with an exit exchange, in which consenting bondholders would receive a new English-law bond with standard creditor protections and lower face value; (3) an exit exchange in which a CAC would only be used if participation falls below a specified threshold. All three exchanges are involuntary in the sense that creditors that dissent or hold out are not repaid in full.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Keywords: sovereign debt

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Date posted: January 27, 2012 ; Last revised: February 1, 2012

Suggested Citation

Gulati, G. Mitu and Zettelmeyer, Jeromin, Engineering an Orderly Greek Debt Restructuring (January 29, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1993037 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1993037

Contact Information

Gaurang Mitu Gulati (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Duke School of Law
Durham, NC 27708
United States
Jeromin Zettelmeyer
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) ( email )
One Exchange Square
London, EC2A 2EH
United Kingdom
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