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A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues


Bruno S. Frey


CREMA; Behavioural Science; Economics
July 1997

The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, Issue 443, pp. 1043-1053, 1997

Abstract:     
When discussing constitutional design, economists concentrate on the propensity of individuals to free ride. Preventing opportunistic behaviour by knaves has costs by crowding out civic virtue. Another view emphasises active citizen participation in order to bolster civic virtue. A viable constitution must therefore be strict enough to deter exploitative behaviour. At the same time, the constitution should fundamentally convey trust towards its citizens and politicians. Distrusting public laws risk destroying the positive attitude of citizens and politicians towards the state. Civic virtue can be maintained and fostered by direct citizen participation via popular referenda and initiatives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 11

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: January 28, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Frey, Bruno S., A Constitution for Knaves Crowds Out Civic Virtues (July 1997). The Economic Journal, Vol. 107, Issue 443, pp. 1043-1053, 1997. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1994201 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.1997.tb00006.x

Contact Information

Bruno S. Frey (Contact Author)
CREMA ( email )
Gellertstrasse 18
Basel
Zurich, CH 8006
Switzerland
Behavioural Science ( email )
Coventry CV4 7AL
United Kingdom
Economics ( email )
Am Seemooser Horn 20
Friedrichshafen, Lake Constance 88045
Germany
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  33
Citations:  76

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