Abstract

Citations (2)

Beta

Footnotes (132)

Beta

One-Click Download | Share | Email | Add to Briefcase

Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia

Rado Bohinc
University of California School of Law

Stephen M. Bainbridge
University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law

December 1999

Abstract:
The basic building blocks of post-privatization Slovenian corporate governance differ rather dramatically from those of the United States. Slovene corporations are characterized by highly concentrated ownership dominated by state-controlled funds and other institutional investors. In addition, Slovene corporation law provides for a two-tier board of directors (similar to the German codetermination system) in which employees are entitled to representation on both the management and supervisory boards. This article provides an analysis of these features, exploring possible reforms in Slovenian law that might enhance the effectiveness of Slovene boards of directors.

JEL Classifications: G30, G38, K22, P31

Working Paper Series

Date posted: February 21, 2000 ; Last revised: April 12, 2000

Suggested Citation

Bohinc, Rado and Bainbridge, Stephen M., Corporate Governance in Post-Privatized Slovenia (December 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=199548 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.199548

Export to: Export Citation What's this?

Contact Information

Stephen Mark Bainbridge (Contact Author) University of California, Los Angeles - School of Law ( email ) 385 Charles E. Young Dr. East Room 1242 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476 United States 310-206-1599 (Phone) 310-825-6023 (Fax) HOME PAGE: http://www.professorbainbridge.com
Rado Bohinc University of California School of Law 385 Charles E. Young Dr. East Room 1242 Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476 United States