Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995666
 
 

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Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions


Hamid Mehran


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

Lindsay Mollineaux


Federal Reserve Bank of New York

January 1, 2012

FRB of New York Staff Report No. 539

Abstract:     
We identify the tension created by the dual demands of financial institutions to be value-maximizing entities that also serve the public interest. We highlight the importance of information in addressing the public’s desire for banks to be safe yet innovative. Regulators can choose several approaches to increase market discipline and information production. First, they can mandate information production outside of markets through increased regulatory disclosure. Second, they can directly motivate potential producers of information by changing their incentives. Traditional approaches to bank governance may interfere with the information content of prices. Thus, the lack of transparency in the banking industry may be a symptom rather than the primary cause of bad governance. We provide the examples of compensation and resolution. Reforms that promote the quality of security prices through information production can improve the governance of financial institutions. Future research is needed to examine the interactions between disclosure, information, and governance.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: financial institutions, governance, disclosure, information, market discipline, financial crisis

JEL Classification: G01, G21, G32, G39

working papers series





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Date posted: January 31, 2012 ; Last revised: September 21, 2012

Suggested Citation

Mehran, Hamid and Mollineaux, Lindsay, Corporate Governance of Financial Institutions (January 1, 2012). FRB of New York Staff Report No. 539. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995666 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1995666

Contact Information

Hamid Mehran (Contact Author)
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
212-720-6215 (Phone)
Lindsay Mollineaux
Federal Reserve Bank of New York ( email )
33 Liberty Street
New York, NY 10045
United States
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