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Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions


Brian L. Connelly


Auburn University

Laszlo Tihanyi


Texas A&M University - Department of Management

S. Trevis Certo


Arizona State University (ASU)

Michael A. Hitt


Texas A&M University - Department of Management

2010

Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 53, pp. 723-742, 2010
Mays Business School Research Paper No. 2012-21

Abstract:     
This research extends agency theory by exploring the influence of varied, competing, principal interests on executive actions. Findings reveal that ownership of a firm by dedicated institutional investors, who hold concentrated portfolios over time, is positively associated with firm use of strategic competitive actions. Ownership by transient institutional investors, who hold broad portfolios and make frequent trades based on current earnings, is negatively associated with strategic competitive actions and positively associated with tactical ones. Appreciable ownership of the same firm by these two classes of investors influences both strategic and tactical competitive actions. These results have broad implications for executives, investors, and policy makers.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

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Date posted: February 1, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Connelly, Brian L., Tihanyi, Laszlo, Certo, S. Trevis and Hitt, Michael A., Marching to the Beat of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions (2010). Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 53, pp. 723-742, 2010 ; Mays Business School Research Paper No. 2012-21. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1995776

Contact Information

Brian L. Connelly (Contact Author)
Auburn University ( email )
Auburn, AL 36849
United States
344-844-6515 (Phone)
Laszlo Tihanyi
Texas A&M University (TAMU) - Department of Management ( email )
430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
S. Trevis Certo
Arizona State University (ASU) ( email )
Farmer Building 440G PO Box 872011
Tempe, AZ 85287
United States
Michael A. Hitt
Texas A&M University (TAMU) - Department of Management ( email )
430 Wehner
College Station, TX 77843-4218
United States
979-458-3393 (Phone)
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