Board Accountability and Risk Taking in Banking – Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment
German Council of Economic Experts
January 1, 2012
Ruhr Economic Paper No. 313
In this paper, a law reform is evaluated that aimed at improving the corporate governance of German savings banks by tightening accountability and legal liability of outside directors. The causal effect of this reform on bank risk is identified by difference-in-differences and triple differences strategies. The estimation results show that savings banks subject to the reform increased capital and liquidity ratios. Hence, they have become less vulnerable to unexpected losses and liquidity shocks. This indicates that the low occurrence of outside director litigation reflects incentive effects of current liability regimes.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 41
Keywords: Corporate governance, outside directors, legal liability, bank risk
JEL Classification: G21, G38, K20
Date posted: February 1, 2012 ; Last revised: April 12, 2012
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.250 seconds