Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=199672
 
 

Citations (9)



 
 

Footnotes (17)



 


 



Tax Competition And Transfer Pricing Disputes


Kashif S. Mansori


Colby College; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Alfons J. Weichenrieder


University of Frankfurt ; Vienna University of Economics and Business; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

October 1999


Abstract:     
Transfer pricing regulations, which are designed to limit multinationals' profit shifting activities, have been tightened in recent years in the US. These new regulations have been enacted to increase the tax revenue collected from multinationals, in response to domestic political concerns that foreign companies are not contributing adequate tax revenues. This paper examines the implications of such a struggle by governments to collect tax revenues from multinational firms. It is shown that such behavior will lead to a non-cooperative equilibrium characterized by the double taxation of corporate profits, and consequently by a depressed level of international trade. Conversely, cooperation between governments could potentially increase both tax revenues and trade.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 15

JEL Classification: F12, H87


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Date posted: December 14, 1999  

Suggested Citation

Mansori, Kashif S. and Weichenrieder, Alfons J., Tax Competition And Transfer Pricing Disputes (October 1999). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=199672 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.199672

Contact Information

Kashif Mansori
Colby College ( email )
Department of Economics 5230 Mayflower Hill
Waterville, ME 04901-8852
United States
207-872-3563 (Phone)
207-872-3263 (Fax)
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de
Alfons J. Weichenrieder (Contact Author)
University of Frankfurt ( email )
Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 4
60054 Frankfurt (Main)
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/fb02/weichenrieder/
Vienna University of Economics and Business ( email )
Welthandelsplatz 1
Vienna, Wien 1020
Austria
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Feedback to SSRN


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Citations:  9
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