Abstract

 


 



The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Decentralization and its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: The Case of Vietnam


Thanh Thuy Vu


Université Paris X Nanterre

Messaoud Zouikri


University Paris West La Défense

Bruno Deffains


Université Paris 2 Panthéon Assas

January 31, 2012

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3714

Abstract:     
Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of Vietnam. This paper finds that the formally decentralized system of public service supply is accommodating the informal one, but informal decentralization in public order provision tends to compete with the existing ineffective formal system. This implies that the central government needs to reorganize the system of decentralizing the provision of public goods/services and public in order to make informal institutions complementary rather than rival or free-riding on formal ones.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: formal decentralization, informal decentralization, sub-central governance, accommodating, and competing

JEL Classification: D730, H110, H730, H830, K000

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 2, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Vu, Thanh Thuy, Zouikri, Messaoud and Deffains, Bruno, The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Decentralization and its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: The Case of Vietnam (January 31, 2012). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3714. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1997077

Contact Information

Thanh Thuy Vu (Contact Author)
University of Paris 10 Nanterre ( email )
EconomiX
Room G301, Building G
Nanterre Cedex, 92001
France
Messaoud Zouikri
University Paris West La Défense ( email )
Nanterre Cedex, 92001
France
Bruno Deffains
Université Paris 2 Panthéon Assas ( email )
12 place du Pantheon
Paris cedex 06, 75231
France
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 359
Downloads: 42

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 1.297 seconds