Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1997538
 
 

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The Economic Regulation of a European Hub Airport: An Iron Triangle?


Philippe Villard


Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Political Sciences

2011

Public Works Management & Policy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 300-319, 2011

Abstract:     
This article examines the economic regulation of a hub European airport and the relationship system between actors involved in, or subjected to, this regulation. Studying the case of Aéroports de Paris, it is argued that airport economic regulation is produced by the strong conjunction of interests between the hub airport’s operator, the dominant airline, and public authorities. These three categories of actors form an “iron triangle” framing and shaping the terms of economic regulation to satisfy their interests, and the shift from a cost-plus to a price-cap regulation does not dramatically threaten the maintenance of the triangle. All other actors (nondominant, domestic airlines, and international air carriers) are excluded from the iron triangle even if they remain deeply affected by its decisions. Finally, this article calls for an analytical generalization of this theorization for semiprivatized European hub airports.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

Keywords: airport policy, economic regulation, iron triangle, Aéroports de Paris, Air France

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Date posted: February 4, 2012 ; Last revised: May 30, 2012

Suggested Citation

Villard, Philippe, The Economic Regulation of a European Hub Airport: An Iron Triangle? (2011). Public Works Management & Policy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 300-319, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1997538

Contact Information

Philippe Villard (Contact Author)
Concordia University, Quebec - Department of Political Sciences ( email )
1455 De Maisonneuve Blvd. West
Office 1228.05
Montréal, QC H3G 1M8
Canada
HOME PAGE: http://politicalscience.concordia.ca/graduate/currentstudents/phil.php
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