Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999067
 
 

References (46)



 


 



What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil


Fernanda Brollo


University of Warwick - Department of Economics

Ugo Troiano


University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

August 2015


Abstract:     
We analyze close elections between male and female mayoral candidates in Brazilian municipalities to provide novel evidence on the role of women as policymakers. Using an objective measure of corruption based on random government audits, we find that female mayors are less likely to engage in corruption compared to male mayors. We also find that female mayors tend to hire less temporary public employees than male mayors, particularly during the electoral year, suggesting that they are less likely to engage in political patronage. Moreover, we find that female mayors have a lower reelection probability than male mayors. We interpret our findings as suggesting that, despite being more corrupt, male mayors are more likely to be reelected due to their involvement in patronage. We provide evidence that is inconsistent with some of the alternative explanations.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 57

Keywords: gender, politics, corruption, patronage

JEL Classification: J16, P16, D72, I00, I18


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Date posted: February 6, 2012 ; Last revised: August 30, 2015

Suggested Citation

Brollo, Fernanda and Troiano, Ugo, What Happens When a Woman Wins an Election? Evidence from Close Races in Brazil (August 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999067 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1999067

Contact Information

Fernanda Brollo
University of Warwick - Department of Economics ( email )
Gibbet Hill Rd.
Coventry, West Midlands CV4 8UW
United Kingdom
Ugo Troiano (Contact Author)
University of Michigan at Ann Arbor - Department of Economics ( email )
611 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1220
United States
HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/a/umich.edu/troiano
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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