Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999077
 


 



Felix Frankfurter's Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges


Burt Neuborne


New York University School of Law

July 15, 2011

New York University Review of Law & Social Change, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 602, 2011
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-15

Abstract:     
A critical overview of judicial activity in the democracy area since Baker v. Carr. Professor Neuborne argues that the failure of the judiciary to commit to a substantive conception of democracy has resulted in a judicially-designed law of democracy that may or may not be defensible on purely doctrinal grounds, but that has resulted in the evolution of a poorly-designed democracy that no rational Founder would have endorsed. The article surveys five lines of judicial authority: (1) defining the eligible electorate: (2) determining the circumstances under which eligible members of the electorate can be disenfranchised; (3) regulating the formal operation of the electoral process, including gerrymandering; (4) determining the ability of voters to influence entrenched political interests; and (5) regulating the funding of electoral campaigns, and concludes that, except for the definition of the eligible electorate, judges have done a poor job in developing the law of democracy. The article argues for a greater sense of judicial responsibility for the quality of the democracy their decisions are shaping.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 64

Keywords: law of democracy, judicial authority, electoral process, campaign financing

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Date posted: March 31, 2012 ; Last revised: April 13, 2012

Suggested Citation

Neuborne, Burt, Felix Frankfurter's Revenge: An Accidental Democracy Built by Judges (July 15, 2011). New York University Review of Law & Social Change, Vol. 35, No. 3, p. 602, 2011; NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999077

Contact Information

Burt Neuborne (Contact Author)
New York University School of Law ( email )
40 Washington Square South
New York, NY 10012-1099
United States
212-998-6172 (Phone)
212-995-4341 (Fax)
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