Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999484
 
 

References (92)



 


 



Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia


Francois Brochet


Boston University - Department of Accounting

Maria Loumioti


University of Southern California

George Serafeim


Harvard University - Harvard Business School

March 12, 2015

Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 12-072

Abstract:     
We study conference calls as a voluntary disclosure channel and create a proxy for the time horizon that senior executives emphasize in their communications. We find that our measure of disclosure time horizon is associated with capital market pressures and executives’ short-term monetary incentives. Consistent with the language emphasized during conference calls partially capturing short-termism, we show that our proxy is associated with earnings and real activities management. Overall, the results show that the time horizon of conference call narratives can be informative about managers’ myopic behavior.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: short termism, corporate performance, conference calls, investor base, risk, cost of capital

JEL Classification: G12, G14, G21, M41


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: February 6, 2012 ; Last revised: April 25, 2015

Suggested Citation

Brochet, Francois and Loumioti, Maria and Serafeim, George, Speaking of the Short-Term: Disclosure Horizon and Managerial Myopia (March 12, 2015). Harvard Business School Accounting & Management Unit Working Paper No. 12-072. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1999484 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1999484

Contact Information

Francois Brochet
Boston University - Department of Accounting ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
Maria Loumioti
University of Southern California ( email )
Los Angeles, CA 90089
United States
George Serafeim (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Harvard Business School ( email )
381 Morgan Hall
Boston, MA 02163
United States
HOME PAGE: http://drfd.hbs.edu/fit/public/facultyInfo.do?facInfo=ovr&facId=15705
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 7,586
Downloads: 1,706
Download Rank: 5,146
References:  92

© 2015 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.375 seconds