Investor Horizons and Corporate Cash Holdings

Abstract:     
We study the effect of investor horizons on corporate cash holdings. We argue that investors with longer horizons monitor more because their net benefit of monitoring is higher. Consequently, the optimal amount of corporate cash holdings increases, so firms hold more cash. We find empirical support for our argument: (1) firms with longer investor horizons hold more cash; (2) when they have excess cash, they invest less and pay out more to shareholders; and (3) they are more likely to invest in projects with long-term payoffs, as evidenced by increased profitability in the long-term. We establish causality using long-term investors who index as an instrument. Our results are not explained by internal corporate governance mechanisms or ownership concentration (blockholders).

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Investor horizons, Institutional investors, Ownership structure, Investor heterogeneity, Corporate governance, Monitoring, Cash holdings

JEL Classification: G23, G31, G32, G34, G35

working papers series