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Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium


Marco Becht


Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES); Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Ariane Chapelle


Université Libre de Bruxelles

Luc Renneboog


Tilburg University - Department of Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)

1999

CentER Working Paper No. 1999-96

Abstract:     
This paper analyses the control of Belgian listed companies. The analysis reveals that control of listed companies in Belgium is highly concentrated. Business groups, holding companies, and voting pacts, play an important role in bringing about this concentration. The main characteristics of the Belgian corporate ownership and equity market can be summarised as follows: (i) few - merely 140 - Belgian companies are listed on the Brussels stock exchange, (ii) there is a high degree of ownership concentration with an average largest direct shareholding of 45%, (iii) holding companies and families, and to a lesser extent industrial companies, are the main investor categories whose share stakes are concentrated into powerful control blocks through business group structures and voting pacts, (iv) control is levered by pyramidal and complex ownership structures and (v) there is a market for share stakes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 43

Keywords: corporate ownership; corporate control; corporate governance

JEL Classification: G34

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Date posted: May 11, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Becht, Marco, Chapelle, Ariane and Renneboog, Luc, Shareholding Cascades: The Separation of Ownership and Control in Belgium (1999). CentER Working Paper No. 1999-96. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=200111 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200111

Contact Information

Marco Becht
Free University of Brussels (VUB/ULB) - European Center for Advanced Research in Economics and Statistics (ECARES) ( email )
Ave. Franklin D Roosevelt, 50
C.P. 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
+32 2 650 2149 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://homepages.ulb.ac.be/~mbecht
Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) - Solvay Brussels School of Economics and Management ( email )
19 Av Franklin Roosevelt
1050
Brussels
Belgium
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
Avenue des Statuaires 120
Brussels, 1180
Belgium
+32 2 650 4466 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org/members_directory/member.php?member_id=6
Ariane Chapelle
Université Libre de Bruxelles ( email )
50 Avenue Roosevelt
Brussels 1050
Belgium
+32.2.650.48.71 (Phone)
+32.2.650.41.88 (Fax)
Luc Renneboog (Contact Author)
Tilburg University - Department of Finance ( email )
P.O. Box 90153
Warandelaan 2
5000 LE Tilburg
Netherlands
+13 31 466 8210 (Phone)
+13 31 466 2875 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Tilburg Law and Economics Center (TILEC)
Warandelaan 2
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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