Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2001203
 
 

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The Determinants of Federal and State Enforcement of Workplace Safety Regulations: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010


Michael D. Makowsky


Johns Hopkins University - Department of Emergency Medicine, Center for Advanced Modeling in the Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences; Hopkins Population Center

Juergen Jung


Towson University - Department of Economics

April 25, 2013


Abstract:     
We explore the determinants of inspection outcomes across 1.6 million Occupational Safety and Health Agency audits from 1990 through 2010. We find that discretion in enforcement differs in state and federally conducted inspections. State agencies are more sensitive to local economic conditions, finding fewer standard violations and fewer serious violations as unemployment increases. Larger companies receive greater lenience in multiple dimensions. Inspector issued fines and final fines, after negotiated reductions, are both smaller during Republican presidencies. Quantile regression analysis reveals that Presidential and Congressional party affiliations have their greatest impact on the largest negotiated reductions in fines.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: regulation, enforcement, occupational safety, institutional differences

JEL Classification: K23, H73, I18

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Date posted: February 8, 2012 ; Last revised: April 27, 2013

Suggested Citation

Makowsky, Michael D. and Jung, Juergen, The Determinants of Federal and State Enforcement of Workplace Safety Regulations: OSHA Inspections 1990-2010 (April 25, 2013). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2001203 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2001203

Contact Information

Michael D. Makowsky (Contact Author)
Johns Hopkins University - Department of Emergency Medicine, Center for Advanced Modeling in the Social, Behavioral, and Health Sciences ( email )
Davis Building, Suite 3220
5801 Smith Avenue
Baltimore, MD 21209
United States
Hopkins Population Center ( email )
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States
Juergen Jung
Towson University - Department of Economics ( email )
Baltimore, MD
United States
812-345-9182 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://pages.towson.edu/jjung/
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