Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002620
 
 

References (29)



 
 

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Free Parking for All in Shopping Malls


Kevin Hasker


Bilkent University

Eren Inci


Sabanci University

February 10, 2012

Sabancı University Working Paper No. 2010/0004

Abstract:     
We show why a shopping mall prefers to provide parking for free and embed the parking costs in the prices of the goods. This holds if the mall has monopoly power or prices competitively; if there is parking validation or a trade-off between shopping and parking spaces. It is also the second-best social optimum. Generally, the equilibrium lot size is too small, yielding a rationale for minimum parking requirements. In urban malls, parking fees may be positive because individuals can use the lot without intending to shop, and lots may become too large because of the trade-off between shopping and parking spaces.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 47

Keywords: land use, lot size, parking fee, parking requirements, shopping mall

JEL Classification: D42, H21, L91, R41, R52

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Date posted: February 11, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Hasker, Kevin and Inci, Eren, Free Parking for All in Shopping Malls (February 10, 2012). Sabancı University Working Paper No. 2010/0004. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002620 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2002620

Contact Information

Kevin Hasker
Bilkent University ( email )
Eren Inci (Contact Author)
Sabanci University ( email )
Orhanli-Tuzla, 34956 Istanbul
Turkey
HOME PAGE: http://myweb.sabanciuniv.edu/ereninci/
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Download Rank: 132,978
References:  29
Citations:  1
Footnotes:  13

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