Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002755
 


 



Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation


Cary Coglianese


University of Pennsylvania Law School

Evan Mendelson


University of Pennsylvania Law School

2010

THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON REGULATION, Martin Cave, Robert Baldwin, Martin Lodge, eds., 2010
U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11
U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-06

Abstract:     
Deciding whether to regulate involves more than making a choice between complete freedom and total control. Individuals and businesses can be regulated but still retain considerable discretion – even to the point of selecting on their own the rules that apply to themselves. In this paper, we focus on this latter kind of regulation, specifically assessing self-regulation as well as what some have called meta-regulation. We begin by conceptually situating these options within a larger regulatory taxonomy, characterizing self-regulation by the unity between the regulator and the regulated entity and defining meta-regulation as those ways that outside regulators seek to induce regulated entities to develop their own self-regulatory responses. Both of these regulatory approaches afford significant discretion to the targets of regulation and as such they may not always seem appropriate, especially if businesses cannot be expected to use their discretion in ways that maximize the public’s overall welfare. To consider the effectiveness of these regulatory alternatives, we present two cases of self-regulation (Responsible Care and the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations) and two cases of meta-regulation (Toxic Use Reduction Act and 33/50). The available evidence on these and other cases indicates that self-regulation and meta-regulation can sometimes achieve regulatory goals, but that their effectiveness can depend upon other, non-regulatory incentives and external pressures that bear down upon businesses. We conclude by suggesting that meta-regulation and self-regulation may be most appropriate when the government lacks ready access to information about regulatory problems and their possible solutions, precisely the kinds of complex circumstances where more conventional forms of regulation face their greatest challenges.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 36

Keywords: regulation, self-regulation, meta-regulation, government, administrative law, rulemaking, corporate social responsibility, voluntary programs

JEL Classification: D78, K23, K32, L51, Q58

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 13, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary and Mendelson, Evan, Meta-Regulation and Self-Regulation (2010). THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON REGULATION, Martin Cave, Robert Baldwin, Martin Lodge, eds., 2010; U of Penn Law School, Public Law Research Paper No. 12-11; U of Penn, Inst for Law & Econ Research Paper No. 12-06. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2002755

Contact Information

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese
Evan Mendelson
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 2,121
Downloads: 485
Download Rank: 31,476
Paper comments
No comments have been made on this paper

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.390 seconds