References (18)



Quadratic Voting

Steven P. Lalley

Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

E. Glen Weyl

Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago

August 13, 2015

N individuals with independent private values must choose among two collective alternatives. A simple, detail-free mechanism, Quadratic Voting (QV), has been suggested based on heuristic arguments and experimental results to maximize utilitarian welfare. We prove that for any value distribution all symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of QV converge towards efficiency, with waste decaying generically as 1/N.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16

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Date posted: February 13, 2012 ; Last revised: August 14, 2015

Suggested Citation

Lalley, Steven P. and Weyl, E. Glen, Quadratic Voting (August 13, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2003531

Contact Information

Steven P. Lalley
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago ( email )
Eckhart Hall Room 108
5734 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/
Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)
Microsoft Research New England ( email )
One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
University of Chicago ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-4862 (Phone)
(773) 702-8490 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
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