Steven P. Lalley
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago
E. Glen Weyl
Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago
August 13, 2015
N individuals with independent private values must choose among two collective alternatives. A simple, detail-free mechanism, Quadratic Voting (QV), has been suggested based on heuristic arguments and experimental results to maximize utilitarian welfare. We prove that for any value distribution all symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of QV converge towards efficiency, with waste decaying generically as 1/N.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 45
Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading
JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16
Date posted: February 13, 2012 ; Last revised: August 14, 2015
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