Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531
 
 

References (18)



 


 



Quadratic Voting


Steven P. Lalley


Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New York City; Yale University

June 29, 2016


Abstract:     
We propose Quadratic Voting as a method for binary collective decision-making: individuals buy votes for their preferred alternative, paying the square of the number of votes purchased. Quadratic cost uniquely makes the marginal cost proportional to votes purchased, encouraging voting proportional to the value and thus efficiency. Similar arguments suggest it is more robust than other efficient mechanisms and it grows naturally from a variety of ideas in disparate literatures. By explicitly characterizing the subtle statistical structure of equilibrium that may have inhibited prior rigorous analysis, we prove convergence towards efficiency in large populations in a canonical environment.

The online appendix for "Quadratic Voting" may be found here: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2790624.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 35

Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16


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Date posted: February 13, 2012 ; Last revised: June 30, 2016

Suggested Citation

Lalley, Steven P. and Weyl, E. Glen, Quadratic Voting (June 29, 2016). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2003531

Contact Information

Steven P. Lalley
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago ( email )
Eckhart Hall Room 108
5734 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/
Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)
Microsoft Research New York City ( email )
641 Avenue of the Americas, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10011
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
Yale University ( email )
28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
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