Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531
 
 

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Quadratic Voting


Steven P. Lalley


Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago

February 26, 2015


Abstract:     
We argue that quadratic pricing of votes on collective decisions is analogous to linear pricing of private goods and thus solves the tyranny of majority created by the one-person-one-vote rule. To do so we propose a solution concept for costly voting models where individuals take the price of influence in units of votes as given. Under this concept, quadratic pricing of votes is the only rule that is always efficient. We then show that all type-symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of an independent private values Quadratic Voting game converge to this efficient price-taking outcome as the population size grows large, with inefficiency generically decaying as 1=N. We discuss the robustness of these conclusions and their implications for market and mechanism design.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: social choice, public goods, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16


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Date posted: February 13, 2012 ; Last revised: February 27, 2015

Suggested Citation

Lalley, Steven P. and Weyl, E. Glen, Quadratic Voting (February 26, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2003531

Contact Information

Steven P. Lalley
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago ( email )
Eckhart Hall Room 108
5734 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/
Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)
Microsoft Research New England ( email )
One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
University of Chicago ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-4862 (Phone)
(773) 702-8490 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
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