Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531
 
 

References (18)



 


 



Quadratic Voting


Steven P. Lalley


Department of Statistics, University of Chicago

E. Glen Weyl


Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago

December 22, 2015


Abstract:     
N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), individuals buy votes in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased, and the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. Heuristic arguments and experimental results have suggested that this simple, detail-free mechanism is utilitarian efficient. In an independent private-values environment, we rigorously prove that for any value distribution all symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of QV converge toward efficiency in large populations, with waste decaying generically as 1/N.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading

JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16


Open PDF in Browser Download This Paper

Date posted: February 13, 2012 ; Last revised: April 30, 2016

Suggested Citation

Lalley, Steven P. and Weyl, E. Glen, Quadratic Voting (December 22, 2015). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003531 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2003531

Contact Information

Steven P. Lalley
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago ( email )
Eckhart Hall Room 108
5734 S. University Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
HOME PAGE: http://galton.uchicago.edu/~lalley/
Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)
Microsoft Research New England ( email )
One Memorial Drive, 14th Floor
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
(857) 998-4513 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
University of Chicago ( email )
1126 East 59th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-4862 (Phone)
(773) 702-8490 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.glenweyl.com
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 14,541
Downloads: 3,896
Download Rank: 1,431
References:  18

© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.219 seconds