Steven P. Lalley
Department of Statistics, University of Chicago
E. Glen Weyl
Microsoft Research New England; University of Chicago
December 22, 2015
N individuals must choose between two collective alternatives. Under Quadratic Voting (QV), individuals buy votes in favor of their preferred alternative from a clearing house, paying the square of the number of votes purchased, and the sum of all votes purchased determines the outcome. Heuristic arguments and experimental results have suggested that this simple, detail-free mechanism is utilitarian efficient. In an independent private-values environment, we rigorously prove that for any value distribution all symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibria of QV converge toward efficiency in large populations, with waste decaying generically as 1/N.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 49
Keywords: social choice, collective decisions, large markets, costly voting, vote trading
JEL Classification: D47, D61, D71, C72, D82, H41, P16
Date posted: February 13, 2012 ; Last revised: April 30, 2016
© 2016 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollobot1 in 0.219 seconds