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Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device


Felipe Kast


Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile

Stephan Meier


Federal Reserve Bank of Boston; Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Columbia Business School - Management

Dina Pomeranz


Harvard Business School


IZA Discussion Paper No. 6311

Abstract:     
While commitment devices such as defaults and direct deposits from wages have been found to be highly effective to increase savings, they are unavailable to the millions of people worldwide who not have a formal wage bill. Self-help peer groups are an alternative commitment device that is widespread and highly accessible, but there is little empirical evidence evaluating their effectiveness. We conduct two randomized field experiments among low-income micro-entrepreneurs in Chile. The first experiment finds that self-help peer groups are very potent at increasing savings. In contrast, a more classical measure, a substantially increased interest rate, has no effect on the vast majority of participants. A second experiment is designed to unbundle the key elements of peer groups as a commitment device, through the use of regular text messages. It finds that surprisingly, actual meetings and peer pressure do not seem to be crucial in making self-help peer groups an effective tool to encourage savings.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: savings, commitment device, peer pressure, field experiment

JEL Classification: O16, D03, D14, D91

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Date posted: February 12, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Kast, Felipe, Meier, Stephan and Pomeranz, Dina, Under-Savers Anonymous: Evidence on Self-Help Groups and Peer Pressure as a Savings Commitment Device. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6311. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2003624

Contact Information

Felipe Kast (Contact Author)
Pontificia Universidad Catolica de Chile ( email )
Ave. Vicuna Mackenna 4860, Macul
Santiago
Chile
Stephan Meier
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston ( email )
600 Atlantic Avenue
Boston, MA 02210
United States
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Columbia Business School - Management ( email )
3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Dina Pomeranz
Harvard Business School ( email )
Soldiers Field Road
Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
United States
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