Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=200372
 


 



Preempting Oneself: The Right and the Duty to Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing


Leo Katz


University of Pennsylvania Law School

August 1999

University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 274

Abstract:     
Economists and philosophers working on problems of rational choice have for some time been concerned with various puzzles raised by so-called "Ullysean" configurations: actors who rationally cause themselves to act irrationally. (e.g., the person who swallows Thomas Schelling's famous irrationality pill to preempt an attempted robbery). What has attracted less attention is that these configurations present fascinating problems for morality, most especially for non-consequentialist morality. This article undertakes the exploration of some of these problems and the implications they hold for the morality of preemptive detention, preemptive self-defense, the creation of prophylactic crimes (like our drug laws) and a variety of other preemptive practices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

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Date posted: May 10, 2000  

Suggested Citation

Katz, Leo, Preempting Oneself: The Right and the Duty to Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing (August 1999). University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 274. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=200372 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.200372

Contact Information

Leo Katz (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-9334 (Phone)
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