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Preempting Oneself: The Right and the Duty to Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing

Leo Katz
University of Pennsylvania Law School


August 1999

University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 274

Abstract:     
Economists and philosophers working on problems of rational choice have for some time been concerned with various puzzles raised by so-called "Ullysean" configurations: actors who rationally cause themselves to act irrationally. (e.g., the person who swallows Thomas Schelling's famous irrationality pill to preempt an attempted robbery). What has attracted less attention is that these configurations present fascinating problems for morality, most especially for non-consequentialist morality. This article undertakes the exploration of some of these problems and the implications they hold for the morality of preemptive detention, preemptive self-defense, the creation of prophylactic crimes (like our drug laws) and a variety of other preemptive practices.

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 10, 2000 ; Last revised: May 13, 2000

Suggested Citation

Katz, Leo, Preempting Oneself: The Right and the Duty to Forestall One's Own Wrongdoing (August 1999). University of Pennsylvania Law School, Institute for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 274. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=200372 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.200372


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Contact Information

Leo Katz (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3400 Chestnut Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6204
United States
215-898-9334 (Phone)
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