Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005314
 
 

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Corporate Strategy, Analyst Coverage, and the Uniqueness Paradox


Lubomir P. Litov


University of Arizona - Department of Finance; University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center

Patrick S. Moreton


Duke University - Fuqua School of Business

Todd Zenger


University of Utah

November 16, 2011

Management Science, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
In this paper we argue that managers confront a paradox in selecting strategy. On the one hand, capital markets systematically discount uniqueness in the investment strategy choices of firms. Uniqueness in strategy heightens the cost of collecting and analyzing information to evaluate a firm’s future value. These greater costs in strategy evaluation discourage the collection and analysis of information regarding the firm, and result in a valuation discount. On the other hand, uniqueness in strategy is a necessary condition for creating economic rents and should, but for this information cost, be positively associated with firm value. We find empirical support for both propositions using a novel measure of investment strategy uniqueness in a firm panel dataset between 1985 and 2007.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34


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Date posted: February 15, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Litov, Lubomir P. and Moreton, Patrick S. and Zenger, Todd, Corporate Strategy, Analyst Coverage, and the Uniqueness Paradox (November 16, 2011). Management Science, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005314

Contact Information

Lubomir P. Litov
University of Arizona - Department of Finance ( email )
McClelland Hall
P.O. Box 210108
Tucson, AZ 85721-0108
United States
520-621-3794 (Phone)
University of Pennsylvania - Wharton Financial Institutions Center
2306 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall
3620 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

Patrick S. Moreton
Duke University - Fuqua School of Business ( email )
Box 90120
Durham, NC 27708-0120
United States
Todd R. Zenger (Contact Author)
University of Utah ( email )
David Eccles School of Business
1655 East Campus Center Drive
Salt Lake City, UT 84112
United States
801 585-3981 (Phone)
801 581-7939 (Fax)
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