Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005954
 


 



Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji


Terra Lawson-Remer


The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs; United Nations - World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER); New York University

February 15, 2012


Abstract:     
A diverse body of recent research identifies collective ownership as a potentially better institution for common pool resource governance under some conditions than either private or state ownership. Extensive previous work analyzes the structure and functioning of successful collective ownership institutions, but there has been limited research examining the impact of stronger collective ownership rights on household welfare. Exploiting a natural experiment - in which some villages were exogenously included in a provincial level initiative to strengthen collective ownership rights over fisheries, while villages in a neighboring province were excluded - this article uses a unique dataset to examine the impact of collective fisheries ownership on household income and food consumption. Strengthening collective ownership rights increases household consumption of marine resources and decreases consumption of inferior canned-food substitutes, but does not increase monetary income. Income improvements that at first appear due to stronger collective ownership institutions can instead be attributed to NGO project support.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 56

Keywords: collective ownership, common pool resources, consumption

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Date posted: February 16, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Lawson-Remer, Terra, Do Stronger Collective Property Rights Improve Household Welfare? Evidence from a Field Study in Fiji (February 15, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005954 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2005954

Contact Information

Terra Lawson-Remer (Contact Author)
The New School Graduate Program in International Affairs ( email )
66 W. 12th Street
New York, NY 10011
United States
United Nations - World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU/WIDER) ( email )
Katajanokanlaituri 6B
Helsinki, FIN-00160
Finland
New York University ( email )
New York, NY
United States
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