Abstract

 
 

References (17)



 


 



Clashes and Compromises: Investment Policies in Tourism Destinations


Guido Candela


University of Bologna - Department of Economics

Massimiliano Castellani


University of Bologna - Department of Economics; University of Bologna - Rimini Center for Economic Analysis (RCEA)

Maurizio Mussoni


University of Bologna - Department of Economics; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA)

2012

Economics: The Open-Access Discussion Paper No. 2012-11

Abstract:     
The authors solve a linear problem where a potential conflict between two agents (Destination manager and Firm) arises in a tourism destination. Destination manager has to choose how to allocate limited resources (capital and land) between either second homes or hotels. This conflict stems from the assumption of agents who have different linear preferences with respect to the allocation of limited resources. As a solution to this policy problem the authors consider three different policies: no intervention (laissez faire), taxation and temporary de-taxation policy. Comparing these different policies, the authors show that a compromise solution (internal solution), which results from the de-taxation policy, may be preferred by both agents over the clash of interests outcomes (corner solutions). Thus, the authors show that in a framework of conflict between agents a compromise solution may be preferable to both the absence of public intervention and the imposition of a tax by a public policy maker who has the discretionary power to regulate conflicts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

Keywords: Conflict resolution, investment decisions, tourism and land use

JEL Classification: D74, G11, L83, R52

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: February 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Candela, Guido, Castellani, Massimiliano and Mussoni, Maurizio, Clashes and Compromises: Investment Policies in Tourism Destinations (2012). Economics: The Open-Access Discussion Paper No. 2012-11. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007734 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2007734

Contact Information

Guido Candela (Contact Author)
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
+39 0541 434118-9 (Phone)
+39 0541 434120 (Fax)
Massimiliano Castellani
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, 40125
Italy
University of Bologna - Rimini Center for Economic Analysis (RCEA) ( email )
Via Patara, 3
Rimini (RN), RN 47900
Italy
Maurizio Mussoni
University of Bologna - Department of Economics ( email )
Strada Maggiore 45
Bologna, BO 40125
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www2.dse.unibo.it/dsa/profile.php?id=232
The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) ( email )
Via Patara, 3
Rimini, RN 47921
Italy
HOME PAGE: http://www.rcfea.org
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 173
Downloads: 15
References:  17

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo6 in 0.406 seconds