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Clashes and Compromises: Investment Policies in Tourism DestinationsGuido CandelaUniversity of Bologna - Department of Economics Massimiliano CastellaniUniversity of Bologna - Department of Economics; University of Bologna - Rimini Center for Economic Analysis (RCEA) Maurizio MussoniUniversity of Bologna - Department of Economics; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA) 2012 Economics: The Open-Access Discussion Paper No. 2012-11 Abstract: The authors solve a linear problem where a potential conflict between two agents (Destination manager and Firm) arises in a tourism destination. Destination manager has to choose how to allocate limited resources (capital and land) between either second homes or hotels. This conflict stems from the assumption of agents who have different linear preferences with respect to the allocation of limited resources. As a solution to this policy problem the authors consider three different policies: no intervention (laissez faire), taxation and temporary de-taxation policy. Comparing these different policies, the authors show that a compromise solution (internal solution), which results from the de-taxation policy, may be preferred by both agents over the clash of interests outcomes (corner solutions). Thus, the authors show that in a framework of conflict between agents a compromise solution may be preferable to both the absence of public intervention and the imposition of a tax by a public policy maker who has the discretionary power to regulate conflicts.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28 Keywords: Conflict resolution, investment decisions, tourism and land use JEL Classification: D74, G11, L83, R52 working papers seriesDate posted: February 20, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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