Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007840
 
 

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Vote Trading with and Without Party Leaders


Alessandra Casella


Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Thomas R. Palfrey


California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Sebastien Turban


California Institute of Technology - Economics

February 2012

NBER Working Paper No. w17847

Abstract:     
Two groups of voters of known sizes disagree over a single binary decision to be taken by simple majority. Individuals have different, privately observed intensities of preferences and before voting can buy or sell votes among themselves for money. We study the implication of such trading for outcomes and welfare when trades are coordinated by the two group leaders and when they take place anonymously in a competitive market. The theory has strong predictions. In both cases, trading falls short of full efficiency, but for opposite reasons: with group leaders, the minority wins too rarely; with market trades, the minority wins too often. As a result, with group leaders, vote trading improves over no-trade; with market trades, vote trading can be welfare reducing. All predictions are strongly supported by experimental results.

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Number of Pages in PDF File: 61

working papers series


Date posted: February 20, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Casella, Alessandra and Palfrey, Thomas R. and Turban, Sebastien, Vote Trading with and Without Party Leaders (February 2012). NBER Working Paper No. w17847. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2007840

Contact Information

Alessandra Casella (Contact Author)
Columbia University - Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, Department of Economics ( email )
420 W. 118th Street
New York, NY 10027
United States
212-854-2459 (Phone)
212-854-8059 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.columbia.edu/~ac186/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Thomas R. Palfrey
California Institute of Technology - Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences ( email )
1200 East California Blvd.
301A Baxter Hall
Pasadena, CA 91125
United States
626-395-4088 (Phone)
626-4432-1726 (Fax)
Sebastien Turban
California Institute of Technology - Economics ( email )
United States
6263954289 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN


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