Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008756
 
 

References (4)



 


 



Mergers with Weak Competition: Reflections on FTC v. Lundbeck


Gregory J. Werden


U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division

February 21, 2012


Abstract:     
In FTC v. Lundbeck, courts rejected a challenge to an acquisition placing under common control the only two drugs for treating a heart defect in newborns. Although the court decisions in the case have been severely criticized, they might well have achieved the right result for the right reason. In a simple model reflecting the weak competition between the drugs found by the courts, duopoly nearly always yields monopoly or near monopoly pricing.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 3

Keywords: mergers, antitrust, duopoly, pharmaceutical pricing

JEL Classification: D43, K21, L13, L41

working papers series


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Date posted: February 22, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Werden, Gregory J., Mergers with Weak Competition: Reflections on FTC v. Lundbeck (February 21, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008756 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2008756

Contact Information

Gregory J. Werden (Contact Author)
U.S. Department of Justice - Antitrust Division ( email )
450 Fifth Street, NW
9th Floor
Washington, DC 20530
United States
202-307-6366 (Phone)
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