Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009580
 


 



Remedial Nonacquiescence


Ross E. Davies


George Mason University School of Law; The Green Bag

2003

Iowa Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 65-121, October 2003
George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-20

Abstract:     
This Article identifies a new kind of nonacquiescence and suggests ways to deal with it. "Nonacquiescence" is an agency's persistence in its own interpretation of a statute in the face of contrary judicial precedent. It has its pros and cons. For example, it aids in the development of a coherent national body of law by facilitating the "percolation" of important issues up to the Supreme Court, but in the short term the very process of percolation imposes on parties the costs of repetitive litigation and uncertainty about the law. The intractability of the problems nonacquiescence raises with respect to the proper role of the administrative state have made it a frequent source of friction between courts and agencies, as well as a hardy perennial in Congress and law reviews.

Traditionally, nonacquiescence has been divided into three forms: intercircuit, intracircuit, and venue choice. But there is at least one more form, which this Article labels "remedial nonacquiescence." Unlike the traditional forms, which involve agency flouting of precedent, remedial nonacquiescence operates silently. Using the National Labor Relations Board as an example, this Article shows how each federal appellate court's commitment to its own "law of the circuit," combined with each court's willingness to enforce broad agency remedial orders that reach beyond a court's geographical jurisdiction, can enable an agency to leverage a court's contempt power to avoid problems of nonacquiescence in other jurisdictions. The results are bad. For example, percolation is corrupted because litigation in multiple circuits on some hard issues is replaced by contempt actions in the original enforcing circuit, yet the costs of repetitive litigation and uncertainty increase because agencies enjoy the flexibility to opt for contempt when the law of the enforcing circuit is favorable, or for a new enforcement action in another jurisdiction when the enforcing circuit's law is unfavorable. Remedial nonacquiescence is, in other words, forum shopping without tears for agencies. Courts can use existing Supreme Court precedent to combat remedial nonacquiescence. To do so, however, they must be modest in their devotion to the "law of the circuit" and in their willingness to impose that law in broad remedial orders.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 58

Keywords: department, Erwin Schrodinger, executive branch, Fireboard, general counsel, government, intent, judge-made, legislative history, NLRB, policymakers, president, regulation, regulatory, Richard Revesz, Samuel Estreicher, separation of powers, U.S., unfair labor practice, United States v. Mendoza

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: February 24, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Davies, Ross E., Remedial Nonacquiescence (2003). Iowa Law Review, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 65-121, October 2003; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12-20. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009580

Contact Information

Ross E. Davies (Contact Author)
George Mason University School of Law ( email )
3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States
The Green Bag ( email )
6600 Barnaby St., NW
Washington, DC 20015
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www.greenbag.org
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 398
Downloads: 20

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.219 seconds