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http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010938
 
 

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The Firm as the Locus of Social Comparisons: Internal Labor Markets Versus Up-or-Out


Emmanuelle Auriol


University of Toulouse I - Advanced Research in Quantitative Applied Development Economics (ARQADE); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Guido Friebel


Goethe University Frankfurt; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)

Frauke Lammers


WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management


IZA Discussion Paper No. 6343

Abstract:     
We suggest a parsimonious dynamic agency model in which workers have status concerns. A firm is a promotion hierarchy in which a worker's status depends on past performance. We investigate the optimality of two types of promotion hierarchies: (i) internal labor markets, in which agents have a job guarantee, and (ii) "up-or-out", in which agents are fired when unsuccessful. We show that up-or-out is optimal if success is difficult to achieve. When success is less hard to achieve, an internal labor market is optimal provided the payoffs associated with success are moderate. Otherwise, up-or-out is, again, optimal. These results are in line with observations from academia, law firms, investment banks and top consulting firms. Here, up-or-out dominates, while internal labor markets dominate where work is less demanding or payoffs are more compressed, for instance, because the environment is less competitive. We present some supporting evidence from academia, comparing US with French economics departments.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: status, promotion hierarchies, incentives, sorting

JEL Classification: J3, M5, L2

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Date posted: February 25, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Auriol, Emmanuelle and Friebel, Guido and Lammers, Frauke, The Firm as the Locus of Social Comparisons: Internal Labor Markets Versus Up-or-Out. IZA Discussion Paper No. 6343. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2010938

Contact Information

Emmanuelle Auriol (Contact Author)
University of Toulouse I - Advanced Research in Quantitative Applied Development Economics (ARQADE) ( email )
21 Allee de Brienne
Toulouse, 31000
France
+33 5 61 12 85 89 (Phone)
+33 5 61 12 86 37 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.idei.asso.fr/English/ECv/CvChercheurs/E
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Guido Friebel
Goethe University Frankfurt ( email )
Grüneburgplatz 1
Frankfurt am Main, 60323
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA)
P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany
Frauke Lammers
WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management ( email )
Burgplatz 2
Vallendar, 56179
Germany
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