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Does Home Ownership Crowd Out Investment in Children's Human Capital?


Elsa Fornero


University of Turin - Department of Economics; Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP)

Agnese Romiti


University of Turin

Mariacristina Rossi


University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics

November 1, 2011

Netspar Discussion Paper No. 11/2011-115

Abstract:     
Parents generally care for their kids, either for altruistic or for strategic reasons. To secure them a better life than their own, they can invest in the children's human capital or accumulate real wealth to bequeath to them. In equilibrium, with complete markets and no imperfection, the marginal returns from the two strategies are equalized, an optimal distribution of children's endowment between human and financial (real) wealth is reached and no crowding out occurs. In the real world, with incomplete and imperfect markets, a displacement can occur. A strong preference for home ownership makes parents inclined to consider the house as the typical bequest-friendly asset, even at the expense of children's education. Misperceptions of the relative returns of the two different forms of wealth, with a perceived excessive premium of the returns from housing wealth, may also be at work. We consider this picture to be highly representative of the Italian situation and analyze the possible trade off between (children's) human and real capital by using the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). Our evidence points in the direction of confirming our hypothesis.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 24

Keywords: Education, bequests, parental investment

JEL Classification: D10, D91, I21

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Date posted: February 28, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Fornero, Elsa, Romiti, Agnese and Rossi, Mariacristina, Does Home Ownership Crowd Out Investment in Children's Human Capital? (November 1, 2011). Netspar Discussion Paper No. 11/2011-115. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2012365 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2012365

Contact Information

Elsa Fornero
University of Turin - Department of Economics ( email )
Via Po, 53
Torino, 10124
Italy
+39-011-6706076 (Phone)
Center for Research on Pensions and Welfare Policies (CeRP)
Via Real Collegio, 30
Moncalieri, Turin
Italy
Agnese Romiti
University of Turin ( email )
Via Po, 53
Torino, Turin - Piedmont 10124
Italy
Mariacristina Rossi (Contact Author)
University of Rome II - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Via Columbia n.2
Rome, rome 00100
Italy
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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