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Mandatory Disclosure Reform and Executive Compensation:
Is CFO Pay Higher After the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS?


Steven Balsam


Temple University - Department of Accounting

Elizabeth A. Gordon


Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

Xi Li


Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management

Emmeli Runesson


Gothenburg University - School of Business, Economics and Law

September 2012


Abstract:     
We find that CFOs receive higher compensation following the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). We propose two potential explanations: improved monitoring and increased responsibility. Consistent with improved monitoring, we find that the increase is positively associated with the loss of private benefits and is negatively associated with existing shareholder monitoring. Consistent with increased responsibility, we find compensation started to increase after the announcement of adoption and increased further after actual adoption. The fact that these increases in compensation are not found for other non-CEO/CFO executives provides assurance that they are related to IFRS adoption.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: mandatory adoption, IFRS, executive compensation, international

JEL Classification: M41, K22, J33

working papers series


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Date posted: February 29, 2012 ; Last revised: October 1, 2012

Suggested Citation

Balsam, Steven, Gordon, Elizabeth A., Li, Xi and Runesson, Emmeli, Mandatory Disclosure Reform and Executive Compensation: Is CFO Pay Higher After the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS? (September 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013653 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2013653

Contact Information

Steven Balsam
Temple University - Department of Accounting ( email )
306 Speakman Hall
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
215-204-5574 (Phone)
215-204-5587 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.sbm.temple.edu/~drb/
Elizabeth A. Gordon
Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )
453 Alter Hall
1801 Liacouras Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
2152046422 (Phone)
Xi Li (Contact Author)
Temple University - Fox School of Business and Management ( email )
1801 Liacouras Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19122
United States
HOME PAGE: http://astro.temple.edu/~xili/
Emmeli Runesson
Gothenburg University - School of Business, Economics and Law ( email )
Vasagatan 1
Göteborg, 405 30
Sweden
+46(0)317861550 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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