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Key Player Policies When Contextual Effects MatterCoralio BallesterUniversidad de Alicante Yves ZenouStockholm University; Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IUI); Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) January 2012 CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8806 Abstract: We consider a model where the criminal decision of each individual is affected by not only her own characteristics, but also by the characteristics of her friends (contextual effects). We determine who the key player is, i.e. the criminal who once removed generates the highest reduction in total crime in the network. We generalize the intercentrality measure proposed by Ballester et al. (2006) by taking into account the change in contextual effects following the removal of the key player. We also provide an example that shows how the new formula can be calculated in practice.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 22 Keywords: contextual effects., Crime, key players, peer effects JEL Classification: A14, D85, K42, Z13 working papers seriesDate posted: March 1, 2012Suggested CitationContact Information
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