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The Scapegoat Theory of Exchange Rates: The First Tests


Marcel Fratzscher


DIW Berlin; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Lucio Sarno


City University London - Sir John Cass Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Gabriele Zinna


Bank of England - International Finance Division

February 2012

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8812

Abstract:     
This paper provides an empirical test of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates (Bacchetta and van Wincoop 2004, 2011), as an attempt to evaluate its potential for explaining the poor empirical performance of traditional exchange rate models. This theory suggests that market participants may at times attach significantly more weight to individual economic fundamentals to rationalize the pricing of currencies, which are partly driven by unobservable shocks. Using novel survey data which directly measure foreign exchange scapegoats for 12 currencies and a decade of proprietary data on order flow, we find empirical evidence that strongly supports the empirical implications of the scapegoat theory of exchange rates, with the resulting models explaining a large fraction of the variation and directional changes in exchange rates. The findings have implications for exchange rate modelling, suggesting that a more accurate understanding of exchange rates requires taking into account the role of scapegoat factors and their time-varying nature.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: economic fundamentals, exchange rates, order flow, scapegoat, survey data

JEL Classification: F31, G10

working papers series


Date posted: March 1, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Fratzscher, Marcel, Sarno, Lucio and Zinna, Gabriele, The Scapegoat Theory of Exchange Rates: The First Tests (February 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8812. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013803

Contact Information

Marcel Fratzscher (Contact Author)
DIW Berlin ( email )
Mohrenstraße 58
Berlin, 10117
Germany
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Lucio Sarno
City University London - Sir John Cass Business School ( email )
106 Bunhill Row
London, EC1Y 8TZ
United Kingdom
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Gabriele Zinna
Bank of England - International Finance Division ( email )
Threadneedle Street
London, EC2R 8AH
United Kingdom
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