Abstract

 


 



Boundedly Rational Dynamic Programming: Some Preliminary Results


Xavier Gabaix


New York University - Stern School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

February 2012

CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8813

Abstract:     
A key open question in economics is the practical, portable modeling of bounded rationality. In this short note, I report on ongoing progress that is more fully developed elsewhere. I present some results from a new model with boundedly rational features in which the decision-maker (DM) builds a simplified representation of the world. The model allows to model boundedly rational dynamic programming in a parsimonious and quite tractable way. I illustrate the approach via a boundedly rational version of the consumption-saving life cycle problem. The consumer can pay attention to the variables such as the interest rate and his income, or replace them, in his mental model, by their average values. Endogenously, the consumer pays little attention to interest rate but pays keen attention to his income. One consequence of this is that Euler equations will be biased, and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution will be biased toward 0, in a manner that is quantitatively important.

Keywords: behavioral economics, bounded rationality, inattention, intertemporal elasticity of substitution

JEL Classification: D03, E21

working papers series


Date posted: March 1, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Gabaix, Xavier, Boundedly Rational Dynamic Programming: Some Preliminary Results (February 2012). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP8813. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013804

Contact Information

Xavier Gabaix (Contact Author)
New York University - Stern School of Business ( email )
Stern School of Business
44 West 4th Street, Suite 9-190
New York, NY 10012-1126
United States
HOME PAGE: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~xgabaix/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
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