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How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability?


Deniz Anginer


Virginia Tech Pamplin Business School; World Bank - Financial and Private Sector Development

Asli Demirgüç-Kunt


World Bank - Financial and Private Sector Development

Min Zhu


City University of Hong Kong; The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan; World Bank - Development Research Group

February 1, 2012

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5981

Abstract:     
Using bank level measures of competition and co-dependence, the authors show a robust positive relationship between bank competition and systemic stability. Whereas much of the extant literature has focused on the relationship between competition and the absolute level of risk of individual banks, in this paper we examine the correlation in the risk taking behavior of banks, hence systemic risk. The analysis finds that greater competition encourages banks to take on more diversified risks, making the banking system less fragile to shocks. Examining the impact of the institutional and regulatory environment on systemic stability shows that banking systems are more fragile in countries with weak supervision and private monitoring, high government ownership of banks, and in countries with public policies that restrict competition. Furthermore, lack of competition has a greater adverse effect on systemic stability in countries with generous safety nets and weak supervision.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 41

Keywords: Banks & Banking Reform, Access to Finance, Debt Markets, Financial Intermediation, Emerging Markets

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Date posted: March 1, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Anginer, Deniz, Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli and Zhu, Min, How Does Bank Competition Affect Systemic Stability? (February 1, 2012). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5981. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2013865

Contact Information

Deniz Anginer (Contact Author)
Virginia Tech Pamplin Business School ( email )
1818 H Street, NW
Washington, DC 20433
United States
World Bank - Financial and Private Sector Development ( email )
United States
Asli Demirgüç-Kunt
World Bank - Financial and Private Sector Development ( email )
United States
202-473-7479 (Phone)
202-522-1155 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ademirguckunt/
Min Zhu
City University of Hong Kong ( email )
83 Tat Chee Avenue
Kowloon
Hong Kong
China
The Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109
United States
World Bank - Development Research Group ( email )
1818 H Street NW
Washington, DC DC 20433
United States
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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