Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014677
 


 



Giving Away the Game? The Impact of the Disclosure Effect on the Patenting Decision


Diana Heger


IHS Economics

Alexandra K. Zaby


University of Tuebingen

2012

ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-010

Abstract:     
This article explores the propensity to patent in the light of the disclosure effect. Unlike earlier approaches concerned with the patenting decision, we take into account that a disclosure effect may decrease the merits of patenting by facilitating inventing around the patent for competitors. In our theoretical model, we find that the disclosure effect - contingent on the competitive environment of the inventor - possibly has substantial negative effects on the propensity to patent. An empirical investigation of the theoretical results finds support for the proposed effects.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 38

Keywords: patenting decision, secrecy, disclosure requirement, patent breadth, horizontal product differentiation, circular city

JEL Classification: L13, L24, O34


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Date posted: March 5, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Heger, Diana and Zaby, Alexandra K., Giving Away the Game? The Impact of the Disclosure Effect on the Patenting Decision (2012). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 12-010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2014677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2014677

Contact Information

Diana Heger (Contact Author)
IHS Economics ( email )
Bleichstr. 1
Frankfurt/Main
Germany
Alexandra Karin Zaby
University of Tuebingen ( email )
Mohlstrasse 36
Tuebingen, Baden Wuerttemberg 72074
Germany
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