Doctor Frankenstein's International Organizations

Andrew T. Guzman

University of California, Berkeley - School of Law

March 2, 2012

UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2015010

In the classic novel, Frankenstein, Doctor Frankenstein creates a living creature in the hope of cheating death. The monster, as the creature is called, horrifies Doctor Frankenstein, turns against him, and kills several people, causing the doctor to regret his decision to make the monster in the first place.

When states establish an international organization (IO), they create an institution with a life of its own on the international stage. Though states can, collectively, control the IO, without unanimity among them the organization can often act on its own. The danger for a state, then, is that its creation, like Frankenstein’s, will become a monster and act contrary to its interests.

In contrast to Frankenstein, however, states are conscious of this risk and are able to guard against it. This Article explains that much of the existing landscape of international organizations has been formed by the state response to this “Frankenstein problem.” The effort by states to avoid creating a monster explains, among other things, why there are so many IOs, why they vary so widely in scope, and the manner in which they are permitted (and not permitted) to affect international law and international relations. The Article also identifies the four types of activities that IOs are allowed to undertake and explains how states choose which activities to place within which organizations. More generally, the Article offers a better understand of why and how IOs are designed and their place within the international legal order.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 42

Keywords: international law, international organizations

JEL Classification: J33

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Date posted: August 29, 2012 ; Last revised: September 21, 2012

Suggested Citation

Guzman, Andrew T., Doctor Frankenstein's International Organizations (March 2, 2012). UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2015010. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2015010 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2015010

Contact Information

Andrew T. Guzman (Contact Author)
University of California, Berkeley - School of Law ( email )
215 Boalt Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720-7200
United States
510-642-8074 (Phone)
510-642-3728 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.andrewguzman.net
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