Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2015779
 
 

References (10)



 
 

Citations (1)



 


 



Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure


Keisuke Nakao


University of Hawaii at Hilo

Masatoshi Tsumagari


Keio University - Faculty of Economics

March 4, 2012

Asian Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Article 6, 2012

Abstract:     
Using a game-theoretic model of criminal procedure, we investigate relative merits and demerits between discretionary and mandatory prosecution. The game illustrates a prosecutor's dilemma associated with his two tasks: evidence production and case screening. Discretionary prosecution makes use of incriminating evidence to dispose of weak cases, but it may suffer the moral-hazard problem in evidence production more seriously than mandatory prosecution. Our welfare analyses suggest that mandatory prosecution outperforms discretionary prosecution when evidence transmission from the prosecutor to the judge is accurate and/or when the cost of litigation incurred by the prosecutor is large.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 10

Keywords: discretionary prosecution, mandatory prosecution, case screening, evidence production

JEL Classification: D02, D73, K41

Accepted Paper Series





Download This Paper

Date posted: March 4, 2012 ; Last revised: December 2, 2013

Suggested Citation

Nakao, Keisuke and Tsumagari, Masatoshi, Discretionary vs. Mandatory Prosecution: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Comparative Criminal Procedure (March 4, 2012). Asian Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 3, Iss. 1, Article 6, 2012. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2015779 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2015779

Contact Information

Keisuke Nakao (Contact Author)
University of Hawaii at Hilo ( email )
Hilo, HI 96720
United States
Masatoshi Tsumagari
Keio University - Faculty of Economics ( email )
2-15-45 Mita, Ninato-ku
Tokyo 1088345
Japan
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 594
Downloads: 72
Download Rank: 200,247
References:  10
Citations:  1

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.422 seconds