Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016310
 
 

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Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore & Offshore Financial Centers


Andrew P. Morriss


University of Alabama School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center

Clifford Chad Henson


Property & Environment Research Center; Skiermont Puckett LLP

March 3, 2012


Abstract:     
Onshore jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, are critical of offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands. Arguments against OFCs include claims that their regulatory oversight is lax, allowing fraud and criminal activity. In this article, we present cross-jurisdictional data, showing that OFCs are not lax. We also provide qualitative analyses of regulatory effectiveness, demonstrating that input-based measures of regulation are inappropriate metrics for comparing jurisdictions. Based on both quantitative input measures and a qualitative assessment, we reject the onshore critique of OFCs as bastions of laxity.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 44

Keywords: offshore financial centers, OFCs, tax competition, financial regulation

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Date posted: March 6, 2012 ; Last revised: August 6, 2012

Suggested Citation

Morriss, Andrew P. and Henson, Clifford Chad, Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore & Offshore Financial Centers (March 3, 2012). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016310 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2016310

Contact Information

Andrew P. Morriss (Contact Author)
University of Alabama School of Law ( email )
P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States
PERC - Property and Environment Research Center ( email )
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States
George Mason University - Mercatus Center ( email )
3401 N. Fairfax Dr.
Ste. 450
Arlington, VA 22201-4433
United States
Clifford Chad Henson
Property & Environment Research Center ( email )
2048 Analysis Drive
Suite A
Bozeman, MT 59718
United States

Skiermont Puckett LLP ( email )
2200 Ross Avenue
Suite 4800W
Dallas, TX 75201
United States
2149786600 (Phone)
2149786601 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.skiermontpuckett.com/
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