Regulatory Effectiveness in Onshore & Offshore Financial Centers
Andrew P. Morriss
Texas A&M School of Law; PERC - Property and Environment Research Center; George Mason University - Mercatus Center
Clifford Chad Henson
Skiermont Puckett LLP; Texas A&M School of Law; Property & Environment Research Center
March 3, 2012
Onshore jurisdictions, such as the United States, United Kingdom, France and Germany, are critical of offshore financial centers (OFCs), such as Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, and the Channel Islands. Arguments against OFCs include claims that their regulatory oversight is lax, allowing fraud and criminal activity. In this article, we present cross-jurisdictional data, showing that OFCs are not lax. We also provide qualitative analyses of regulatory effectiveness, demonstrating that input-based measures of regulation are inappropriate metrics for comparing jurisdictions. Based on both quantitative input measures and a qualitative assessment, we reject the onshore critique of OFCs as bastions of laxity.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 44
Keywords: offshore financial centers, OFCs, tax competition, financial regulation
Date posted: March 6, 2012 ; Last revised: August 6, 2012
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