Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016340
 


 



Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation?


Nuno M. Garoupa


University of Illinois College of Law

Luciana Echazu


Clarkson University

January 5, 2012

International Review of Law and Economics, 2012
Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS12-03

Abstract:     
In this paper we consider the potential effects that the application of a loser-pays-all rule may have on criminal litigation, including the decision to prosecute, criminal deterrence and legal error. We find that the effects of fee shifting on deterrence and on miscarriage of justice go in opposite directions. We also look at the effects of this rule on the rate of settlements (plea-bargaining) and when one party is wealth-constrained. We apply the insights of our model to current policy discussions such as the use of RICO proceedings and the financing of enforcement authorities in the United States.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 29

Keywords: loser-pays-all rule, fee shifting, prosecutor, criminal litigation

JEL Classification: K1, K4

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Date posted: March 6, 2012 ; Last revised: September 12, 2012

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno M. and Echazu, Luciana, Why Not Adopt a Loser-Pays-All Rule in Criminal Litigation? (January 5, 2012). International Review of Law and Economics, 2012; Illinois Program in Law, Behavior and Social Science Paper No. LBSS12-03. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016340

Contact Information

Nuno M. Garoupa (Contact Author)
University of Illinois College of Law ( email )
504 E. Pennsylvania Avenue
Champaign, IL 61820
United States
HOME PAGE: http://works.bepress.com/nunogaroupa/
Luciana Echazu
Clarkson University ( email )
Potsdam, NY 13699-5780
United States
315-268-6456 (Phone)
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