Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016610
 
 

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Non-Discretionary Conservatism: Evidence and Implications


Alastair Lawrence


University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Richard G. Sloan


University of California at Berkeley - Haas School of Business

Yuan Sun


Boston University - School of Management

October 2013

Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Vol. 56, No. 2-3 (Supplement), 2013

Abstract:     
A large body of accounting research finds that various contracting incentives lead managers to engage in conservative accounting practices. We extend existing research by modeling the impact of extant accounting rules on conservative accounting. Accounting rules typically require assets to be written down when their fair values drop sufficiently below their book values. We document evidence of the resulting non-discretionary conservatism and show that it appears to explain some of the results from previous research on contracting incentives.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 60

Keywords: Non-discretionary conservatism, conditional conservatism, book-to-market, asset impairment.

JEL Classification: M41, C23, D21, G32

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Date posted: March 14, 2012 ; Last revised: January 7, 2014

Suggested Citation

Lawrence, Alastair and Sloan, Richard G. and Sun, Yuan, Non-Discretionary Conservatism: Evidence and Implications (October 2013). Journal of Accounting & Economics (JAE), Vol. 56, No. 2-3 (Supplement), 2013. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016610 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2016610

Contact Information

Alastair Lawrence
University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
HOME PAGE: http://www2.haas.berkeley.edu/Faculty/lawrence_alastair.aspx
Richard G. Sloan (Contact Author)
University of California at Berkeley - Haas School of Business ( email )
545 Student Services Building
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States
Yuan Sun
Boston University - School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA MA 02215
United States
1-617-353-2353 (Phone)
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