Abstract

 
 

Citations



 


 



Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games


Abraham Neyman


Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Rann Smorodinsky


Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management

April 9, 2004

Mathematics of Operations Research, Forthcoming

Abstract:     
The asymptotic value, introduced by Kannai in 1966, is an asymptotic approach to the notion of the Shapley value for games with infinitely many players. A vector measure game is a game v where the worth v(S) of a coalition S is a function f of mu(S) of mu is a vector measure. Special classes of vector measure games are the weighted majority games and the two-house weighted majority games, where a two-house weighted majority game is a game in which a coalition is winning if and only if it is winning in two given weighted majority games. All weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. However, not all two-house weighted majority games have an asymptotic value. In this paper, we prove that the existence of infinitely many atoms with sufficient variety suffice for the existence of the asymptotic value in a general class of nonsmooth vector measure games that includes in particular two-house weighted majority games.

Keywords: asymptotic value, weighted majority game, two-house weighted majority game, vector measure game, Shapley value

JEL Classification: C71

Accepted Paper Series


Date posted: March 7, 2012  

Suggested Citation

Neyman, Abraham and Smorodinsky, Rann, Asymptotic Values of Vector Measure Games (April 9, 2004). Mathematics of Operations Research, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017418

Contact Information

Abraham Neyman
Hebrew University of Jerusalem ( email )
Feldman Building
Givat-Ram
Jerusalem, 91904
Israel
972-2-6586251 (Phone)
972-2-6513681 (Fax)
Rann Smorodinsky (Contact Author)
Technion-Israel Institute of Technology - The William Davidson Faculty of Industrial Engineering & Management ( email )
Haifa 32000
Israel
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 111

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.265 seconds