Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017802
 
 

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Intellectual Property Contracts: Theory and Evidence from Screenplay Sales


Milton Harris


University of Chicago - Finance

S. Abraham Ravid


Yeshiva University - Syms School of Business

Suman Basuroy


University of Oklahoma - Division of Marketing

August 14, 2012

Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-04
Fama-Miller Working Paper

Abstract:     
This paper presents a model of intellectual property contracts. We explain why many intellectual property contracts are contingent on eventual production or success, even without moral hazard on the part of risk-averse sellers. The explanation is based on differences of opinion between buyers and sellers, and reputation building through multiple transactions. Our model predicts that more reputable sellers will be offered a very different mix of cash and contingency payments than inexperienced sellers. We also discuss the probability of sales as a function of seller and product characteristics. The theoretical model is tested on a data base of screenplay contracts.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 59

Keywords: Intellectual property, contracting, divergence of beliefs, reputation, screenplays

JEL Classification: G30, L14

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Date posted: March 12, 2012 ; Last revised: April 11, 2013

Suggested Citation

Harris, Milton and Ravid, S. Abraham and Basuroy, Suman, Intellectual Property Contracts: Theory and Evidence from Screenplay Sales (August 14, 2012). Chicago Booth Research Paper No. 13-04; Fama-Miller Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017802 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2017802

Contact Information

Milton Harris
University of Chicago - Finance ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
(773) 702-2549 (Phone)
(773) 753-8310 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/milton.harris/

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

S. Abraham Ravid (Contact Author)
Yeshiva University - Syms School of Business ( email )
United States
Suman Basuroy
University of Oklahoma - Division of Marketing ( email )
United States
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