Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017942
 
 

Footnotes (47)



 


 



Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis


Brian Bix


University of Minnesota Law School

2011

American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 56, pp. 45-57, 2011
Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-13

Abstract:     
Gustav Radbruch, in well-known work that appeared just after World War II, put forward a formula that stated that state-promulgated rules that are sufficiently unjust lose their status as valid law. Radbruch’s Formula has generally been understood as a claim about the nature of law, and recent variations of Radbruch’s Formula, like Robert Alexy’s “claim to correctness,” have similarly been characterized as offering a truth about the nature of law. Additionally, both Radbruch’s and Alexy’s theories have been presented as criticisms of, and alternatives to, legal positivism. An alternative understanding of the Formula (and its modern variations) is as (mere) prescriptions for judicial decision-making, and thus compatible with a variety of different conceptual theories of the nature of law, including legal positivism. This article shows the difficulties of understanding Radbruch’s Formula as it was presented and conventionally understood. In particular, the article focuses on the way that seeing the Formula as a claim about the nature of law leads to outcomes inconsistent with the basic reasons for the Formula.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 14

Keywords: Gustav Radbruch, Radbruch's Formula, Robert Alexy, Conceptual Analysis

Accepted Paper Series


Download This Paper

Date posted: March 8, 2012 ; Last revised: March 29, 2012

Suggested Citation

Bix, Brian, Radbruch's Formula and Conceptual Analysis (2011). American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 56, pp. 45-57, 2011; Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12-13. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2017942

Contact Information

Brian Bix (Contact Author)
University of Minnesota Law School ( email )
229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States
612-624-2505 (Phone)
612-625-2011 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,307
Downloads: 348
Download Rank: 47,581
Footnotes:  47

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.313 seconds